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Defendants and Appellants.
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UTAH RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL,
INC., at Utah corporation, JOHN H. MORGAN, JR., JUSTHEIM PETROLEUM CO.,
a Nevada corporation, CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM and J. H. MORGAN, SR.
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
- vs. UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS,
CHARLES R. HANSEN, CECIL THOMSON, DONALD SHOWALTER, M. V.
HATCH, HAROLD REESE, WHITNEY
J. FLOYD, PHILLIP PCHRISTENSEN, T.
H. BELL and W. L. TUELLER,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
12131

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiffs sought to en join the Defendant from issuing
a lease to a third party covering oil shale on lands currently under an oil, gas and hydrocarbon lease to Plaintiffs.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs obtained a permanent injunction declaring
that Defendant cannot issue an Oil Shale Lease on lands
which are covered by existing Oil, Gas and Hydrocarbon
Leases.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts in the briefs of Plaintiffs and
Defendant are correct and adequate, however by way of
introduction, Gas Producing Enterprises, Inc., hereinafter designated Amicus, makes the following statement:
Amicus is an operating oil and gas company in two
separate oil and gas fields in the State of Utah, portions
of which are under oil, gas and hydrocarbon leases from
the Utah State Land Board. As an operating and producing oil and gas company, Amicus will be directly affected
by the Court's determination. Without question, all parties, including Amicus, have a vital financial stake in the
development and production of the natural resources of
the State of Utah. The importance and ramifications of
the questions raised in this matter, however, exceed the
scope of the party litigants and will be felt by the public
as a whole, through the oil and gas industry. The sole purpose of Amicus is to assist the Court, in any way possible,
to recognize the effects of this case upon the industry.
I
THE PROPER SCOPE OF A STATE
MINERAL LEASE
A mineral lease granted by the State Land Board is
a license to prospect on state owned lands for deposits of
a specified mineral or minerals for a given period of time,
in consideration for an annual rental fee. If the lessee is a
successful prospector and finds a valuable deposit of the
specified mineral, the lease further grants to the lessee an
exclusive right to mine or extract said mineral so long as
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lessee pays a royalty and complies with the others terms
of the lease agreement.
A mineral lease, while it purports to relate to specified lands, is not a land lease, nor does the lessee possess
rights in land unless a mineral deposit is discovered and
a mining operation commenced. The term "lease," certainly during the pre-discovery stage, is somewhat of a
mis-nomer; the agreement is more of an exploration permit or license, and has been referred to by one Land Board
member as a "hunting license." Certainly the State of
Utah does not represent nor warrant to the lessee that a
deposit of mineral will be found in the leased lands, or
that the lands are even prospecitvely valuable for minerals of any type.
Statutory command commits and demands that the
State adhere, through the State Land Board, to the principle of multiple use of state lands. Terms and provisions
arc incorporated into the Land Board's regulations and
the mineral leases to effectuate this principle. The legislative command is cognizant of the necessity of the Land
Roard in administering the mineral leasing program to
achieve multiple use. Section 65-1-18, Utah Code Annotated, states in part:
"In furtherance of the principle of multiple use
of state lands, the land board may grant a lease
for the prospecting, exploration, development and
production of any mineral notwithstanding the issuance of other lease or leases on the same land for
other minerals, and shall include in such lease suitable stipulations for simultaneous operation. The
board shall not issue more than one outstanding
lease for the same purpose on the same land. All
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mineral leases issued by the board shall contain
such terms and provisions as the board deems to
be in the best interest of the state ... " (
added)
It must not be presumed that a mineral lease, for
whatever mineral, ripens into a full "lease," with all of
the concommitant provisions of the agreement coming
into full force, until a deposit of the specified mineral is
in fact discovered and extraction operations are capable
of being commenced. As a matter of fact, the vast ma·
jority of issued state mineral leases never ripen past the
exploration stage, since no mineral deposit is found.
II
WHAT DOES A MINERAL LEASE
PROPERLY COVER?
Having analyzed the nature of a mineral lease, and
pointed out the exploration or "hunting license" aspect
of a mineral lease prior to discovery and extraction, it is
proper to inquire into what precisely does a mineral lease
authorize the holder to explore for and produce.
In the past little confusion has resulted from the
nomenclature used to specify the mineral or minerals
covered by a State of Utah mineral lease. Modem al·
chemy, however, seems capable of changing many natural
mineral deposits into a different form, so as to yield syn·
thetic substances and products by a variety of processes
not previously thought possible. This is especially so in the
case of the natural hydrocarbons, petroleum, coal, gilson·
ite, asphalt, bitumen and kerogen, which can be converted
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to yield synthetic gasoline, lubricating oils and a variety
of fuels. This fact seems to be the source of the problem
which gave rise to the case at bar.
If technological progress has tended to cloud historic concepts, it is up to the courts to reestablish workable
standards and definitions. This court is now confronted
with such an opportunity. The contending parties to this
litigation are at odds over the meaning of the terms "oil,
gas and hydrocarbons." The meaning of these terms can
be readily ascertained by reference to the legislative history of the 1967 statute, to customary usage and other
reliable sources.
Appellant's brief adequately relates the many conversions and synthetic processes capable of producing
petroleum products from a variety of quite dissimilar
natural hydrocarbon deposits separately leased by the
State of Utah. The gasoline commercially synthesized
from Utah gilsonite, a solid pitch-like hydrocarbon, and
sold in Chevron Oil Co. service stations throughout western Colorado and eastern Utah, is indistinguishable from
gasoline produced and sold elsewhere.
The point which we, as Amicus, want to make clear
is that such terms as are used by the State of Utah to define leased minerals, if they are to have useful and workable meanings, must relate to the original, natural form
of the deposit as it occurs in the ground; and not to possible or even probable end products which may be converted or synthesized from the natural substances. If leases
were issued on the ultimate or end-product from a given
mineral, chaos accompanied by bizarre problems would
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result. In so urging the Court, we recognize that Respon.
dent argues a contrary point as one facet of its brief.
We are confident that the issue before the Court can
and will be resolved on the basis of other, more pertinent
arguments. We are apprehensive that the Court, unaware
of the consequences to our industry, may adopt Respond.
ent's arguments on this point and thereby create confus.
ion and the basis for more conflict in the future.

III
THE EFFECTS OF EXTENDING THE
1968 MORGAN CASE
Appellees argue at great length that the Utah Supreme Court decision in Morgan v. Utah Board of State
Lands, 21 Utah 2d 364, 445 P2d 776 ( 1968) is applicable
to, and indeed controls, the case at bar. Amicus believes
that the 1968 Morgan decision has no application to this
case, and that the case should be decided on the basis of
the legislative intent behind Section 65-1-18, Utah Code
Annotated.
In deciding the 1968 Morgan case this Court was
undoubtedly influenced by the enactment by the legisla·
ture a few months earlier of a statute resolving the very
conflict then before the Court. The legislature and the
Land Board were fully aware of the historic distinction
between oil and gas deposits and oil shale deposits. Mr.
Max Gardner, Director of the State Land Board, ad·
dressed the Utah Senate on February 17, 1967 on the pur·
poses of the proposed statute and stated the following:
"The purposes of drafting the bill a:e very
First of all, there would be extensive rev1s1on ot
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the Land Board general leasing policies. It would
permit the Board to adopt a form of lease, the socalled single form of hydrocarbon lease which
would grant to the lessee the right to produce all
hydrocarbons except oil shale and coal. Oil shale
and coal would be excepted. The Land Board in
the past year and a half has conducted many and
extensive public hearings on this subject and is
convinced that it would be in the best interest of
the state to issue this so-called single form of hydrocarbon lease. (See Senate Journal 1967, p. 559
and record number XI of the 40th day.)
The language of Morgan, supra, is indicative of an examination of two leases only. At page 777 of the Pacific
Reporter:

"Two types of leases were approved by the Board
and were known as oil and gas leases and bituminous sands leases."

* * * *

"In order to forestall disputes between the lessees
as to whether a given quantity of oil came from a
bituminous or from a natural reservoir of oil ... "

* * * *

"Other provisions of the amended act permitted
the lessee named in one of the two types of oil
leases ... " (emphasis added)
At page 90 of the transcript Mr. Charles R. Hansen testified that Exhibit D-15, a current form of an oil shale
lease, was in effect at the time of Morgan, supra.

Q. "And was that oil shale lease in use, force and
effect at the time of the Morgan case in 1967?"

. "
A. "Yes, sir.
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In subsequent statutes the Utah legislature has con.
tinued to recognize a distinction bewteen oil shale and
other forms of mineral deposits leased by the State Land
Board. In 1969 Sections 65-1-111 through 65-1-114, Utah
Code Annotated were enacted making rental credit pro.
visions on state mineral leases expressly applicable to oil
shale leases, but not to the oil, gas and hydrocarbon leases.
The 1968 Morgan case involved entirely different
circumstances and evidence, and was decided against a
different factual background from the case now before
this Court. It was intended to forestall a specific type of
conflict and a few isolated statements in that decision,
taken out of context, should not be used to expand the
conflict into new areas. The statements by the Court in
Morgan, at page 776:
" . . . That the mineral recovered from either
source was the same ..." (emphasis added)
and at page 777:
"It became impossible to distinguish the oil devel·
oped and extracted by the two processes." (em·
phasis added)
and:
". . . The policy [by the legislature] of allowing
but one lease for the extraction of oil from any
particular tract of public land." (emphasis added)
can be, and are being, asserted as support of the proposi·
tion that the mineral referred to in a state mineral lease
is really the "end product" and not the natural deposit as
found in the earth. And that oil means the conventional
petroleum substance sold in commerce, without regard to
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ongm or any distinction between natural petroleum on
the one hand, and converted or synthetic oil, on the other
hand.

If, indeed, Morgan has any bearing upon this case,
then this Court is confronted with a unique opportunity
to interpret its own cited statements and put such assertions to rest forever.
CONCLUSION
Mineral leases are merely "hunting" permits which
ripen into full "leases" upon discovery of a mineral deposit, and when extraction operations are capable of being commenced. Manufactured synthetic products which
at the present time are the possible or even probable end
products from the natural substances should not be used
to denote, define and classify which natural mineral deposits a mineral lease covers. The mineral terms used by
the State in mineral leases must relate to the original
natural form of the deposit as it occurs in the ground to
be meaningful.
Morgan, supra, has no application to the case at
bar. Morgan dealt with the recognized conflict of bitum-

inous sands leases and oil and gas leases. The legislative
history of Section 65-1-18, U.C.A., ( 1953), together with
subsequent legislation found in Sections 65-1-111 through
and inclusive of 65-1-114, indicates that oil shale was not
to be covered by the oil, gas and hydrocarbon lease. If the
Court feels that Morgan, supra, has any bearing on the
instant case, care should be taken to clarify and explain
Af organ in light of the legislative history and the impact
of the adoption by this Court of a unique definition of

•
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minerals based upon "end product." Heretofore the in·
dustry has enjoyed a uniformity, both in Federal and State
mineral leases, in the application of the definition of min·
erals in the original, natural form of deposit.
Respectfully submitted,
Jam es R. Brown and
Robert G. Pruitt, Jr.
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
1000 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

